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Abstract
Due to the amount of data that smartphone applications
can potentially access, platforms enforce permission sys-
tems that allow users to regulate how applications access
protected resources. If users are asked to make security
decisions too frequently and in benign situations, they
may become habituated and approve all future requests
without regard for the consequences. If they are asked to
make too few security decisions, they may become con-
cerned that the platform is revealing too much sensitive
information. To explore this tradeoff, we instrumented
the Android platform to collect data regarding how of-
ten and under what circumstances smartphone applica-
tions are accessing protected resources regulated by per-
missions. We performed a 36-person field study to ex-
plore the notion of “contextual integrity,” that is, how of-
ten are applications accessing protected resources when
users are not expecting it? Based on our collection of 27
million data points and exit interviews with participants,
we examine the situations in which users would like the
ability to deny applications access to protected resources.
We found out that at least 80% of our participants would
have preferred to prevent at least one permission request,
and overall, they thought that over a third of requests
were invasive and desired a mechanism to block them.
1 Introduction
Mobile platforms enforce permission models to regulate
how applications access certain resources, such as users’
personal information or sensor data (e.g., camera, GPS,
etc.). For instance, Android prompts the user during ap-
plication installation with a list of all the abilities that that
application may use in the future; if the user is uncom-
fortable granting any of these requests, her only option is
to discontinue installing the application [3]. On iOS, the
user is prompted at runtime when an application requests
any one of a handful of data types for the first time, such
as location, address book contacts, or photos [34].
Research has shown that few people read the An-
droid permission requests and even fewer comprehend
them [16]. Another problem is habituation: on average,
Android applications present the user with four permis-
sion requests during the installation process [13]. While
iOS users are likely to see far fewer permission requests
than Android users, because there are fewer possible per-
missions and they are only displayed the first time the
data is actually requested, it is not clear whether or not
users are being prompted about access to data that they
actually find concerning, or whether they would approve
of subsequent requests [15].
Nissenbaum posited that the reason why most privacy
models fail to predict violations is that they fail to con-
sider contextual integrity [32]. That is, privacy violations
occur when personal information is used in ways that
defy users’ expectations. We believe that this notion of
“privacy as contextual integrity” can be applied to smart-
phone permission systems to yield more effective per-
missions by only prompting users when an application’s
access to sensitive data is likely to defy expectations. As
a first step down this path, we examined how applica-
tions are currently accessing this data and then examined
whether or not it complied with users’ expectations.
We modified Android to log whenever an application ac-
cessed a resource that was protected by application per-
missions and then gave these modified smartphones to 36
participants who used them as their primary phones for
one week. The purpose of this was to perform dynamic
analysis to determine how often various applications are
actually accessing protected resources under realistic cir-
cumstances. Afterwards, subjects returned to the labora-
tory to return the phones and complete exit surveys. We
showed them various instances over the past week where
applications had accessed certain types of data and asked
whether those instances were expected, and whether they
would have denied access, if given the opportunity. Par-
ticipants stated a desire to block a third of the requests,
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and that their decision processes were governed by two
related underlying factors: whether they had privacy con-
cerns surrounding the specific data type and whether they
understood why the application needed it.
We contribute the following:
• To the best of our knowledge, we performed the first
field study to quantify the permission usage by third
party applications under realistic circumstances.
• We show that our participants wanted to block ac-
cess to protected resources a third of the time. This
suggests that some requests should be granted by
runtime consent dialogs, rather than the current all-
or-nothing install-time approval approach.
• We model participants’ decisions and show how a
runtime classifier may be able to determine when to
confront users with permission decisions.
2 Related Work
While users are required to approve Android application
permission requests prior to installation, most users do
not pay attention to these requests, and fewer fully com-
prehend them [16, 26]. In fact, studies have shown that
even developers are not fully knowledgeable about per-
missions [40], and are given a lot of freedom when post-
ing an application to the Google Play Store [7]. Appli-
cations often do not follow the principle of least privi-
lege, intentionally or unintentionally [44]. Other work
has made suggestions on improving the Android per-
mission model with better definitions and hierarchical
breakdowns [8]. Some researchers have experimented
with adding fine-grained access control to the Android
model [11]. Providing users with more privacy informa-
tion and personal examples has been shown to help users
in choosing applications with fewer permissions [21,27].
Previous work has examined the overuse of permis-
sions by applications [13, 20], and attempted to iden-
tify malicious applications through their permission re-
quests [36], or through natural language processing of
application descriptions [35]. Researchers have addition-
ally developed static analysis tools to analyze Android
permission specifications [6, 9, 13]. Felt et al. created a
permission map through static analysis of many Android
applications. They found that roughly one-third of their
tested applications were over-privileged. Our work com-
plements this static analysis by applying dynamic analy-
sis to permission usage. Other dynamic analysis has been
applied to native (non-Java) APIs among third-party mo-
bile markets [39], whereas we apply it to the Java APIs
available to developers in the Google Play Store.
Researchers examined user privacy expectations sur-
rounding application permissions, and found that users
were often surprised by the abilities of background ap-
plications to collect data [25, 42]. Their level of con-
cern varied from annoyance to seeking retribution when
presented with possible risks associated with permis-
sions [15]. Some studies employed crowdsourcing to
create a privacy model based on user expectations [30].
Researchers have designed systems to track or reduce
privacy violations by recommending applications based
on users’ security concerns [2, 12, 19, 24, 28, 46–48].
Other tools dynamically block runtime permission re-
quests [37]. Enck et al. found that a considerable number
of applications transmitted location or other user data to
third parties without requiring user consent [12]. Horny-
ack et al.’s AppFence system gave users the ability to
deny data to applications or substitute fake data [24].
However, this broke application functionality for one-
third of the applications tested.
Reducing the number of security decisions a user must
make at install-time or run-time is likely to decrease ha-
bituation, and therefore, it is critical to identify which
security decisions users should be asked to make. Based
on this theory, Felt et al. created a decision tree to aid
platform designers in determining the most appropri-
ate permission-granting mechanism for a given resource
(e.g., access to benign resources should be granted auto-
matically, whereas access to dangerous resources should
require approval) [14]. They concluded that the major-
ity of Android permissions can be automatically granted,
but 16% (corresponding to the 12 permissions in Table
1) should be granted via runtime dialogs.
Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity can help us
to analyze “the appropriateness of a flow” in the con-
text of permissions granted to Android applications [32].
There is ambiguity in defining when an application actu-
ally needs access to user data to run properly. It is quite
easy to see why a location-sharing application would
need access to GPS data, whereas that same request com-
ing from a game like Angry Birds is less obvious. “Con-
textual integrity is preserved if information flows accord-
ing to contextual norms” [32], however, the lack of thor-
ough documentation on the Android permission model
makes it easier for programmers to neglect these norms,
whether intentionally or accidentally [38]. Deciding on
whether an application is violating users’ privacy can be
quite complicated since “the scope of privacy is wide-
ranging” [32]. To that end, we performed dynamic analy-
sis to measure how often (and under what circumstances)
applications were accessing protected resources, whether
this complied with users’ expectations, as well as how
often they might be prompted if we adopt Felt et al.’s
proposal to require runtime user confirmation before ac-
cessing a subset of these resources [14].
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3 Methodology
Our long-term research goal is to minimize habituation
by only confronting users with necessary security de-
cisions by not showing them permission requests that
are either expected, reversible, or unconcerning. In this
study, we explored the problem space in two parts: we
instrumented Android so that we could collect actual us-
age data to understand how often access to various pro-
tected resources is requested by applications in practice,
and then we surveyed our participants to understand the
requests that they would not have granted, if given the
option. This field study involved 36 participants over the
course of one week of normal smartphone usage. In this
section, we describe the log data that we collected, our
recruitment procedure, and then our exit survey.
3.1 Tracking Access to Sensitive Data
In Android, when applications attempt to access pro-
tected resources (e.g., personal information, sensor data,
etc.), the operating system checks to see whether or
not the requesting application has been granted permis-
sion. We modified the Android platform to add a logging
framework so that we could determine every time one of
these resources was accessed by an application. Because
our target device was a Samsung Nexus S smartphone,
we modified Android 4.1.1 (Jellybean), which was the
newest version of Android supported by our hardware.
3.1.1 Data Collection Architecture
Our goal was to collect as much data as possible
surrounding each applications’ access to protected re-
sources, while minimizing our impact on system perfor-
mance. Our data collection framework consisted of two
main components: a series of “producers” that hooked
various Android API calls and a “consumer” embedded
in the main Android framework service that wrote the
data to a log file and uploaded it to our collection server.
We logged three kinds of permission requests. First, we
logged function calls checked by checkPermission()
in the Android Context implementation. Instru-
menting the Context implementation, instead of the
ActivityManagerService or PackageManager, al-
lowed us to also log the function name invoked by the
user-space application. Next, we logged access to the
ContentProvider class, which verifies the read and
write permissions of an application prior to it accessing
structured data (e.g., contacts or calendars) [5]. Finally,
we tracked permission checks during Intent transmis-
sion, by instrumenting the ActivityManagerService
and BroadcastQueue. Intents allow an application to
pass messages to another application when an activity is
to be performed in that other application (e.g., opening a
URL in the web browser) [4].
We created a component called Producer, which fetches
the data from the above instrumented points and sends it
back to the Consumer, which is responsible for logging
everything reported. Producers are scattered across
the Android Platform, since permission checks occur in
multiple places. We placed the Producer that fetched
the most data in system server, which recorded direct
function calls to Android’s Java API. For a majority of
privileged function calls, when a user application invokes
the function, it sends the request to system server
via Binder. Binder is the most prominent IPC mech-
anism implemented to communicate with the Android
Platform (whereas Intents communicate between ap-
plications). For requests that do not make IPC calls to the
system server, a Producer is placed in the user appli-
cation context (e.g., in the case of ContentProviders).
The Consumer class is responsible for logging data
produced by each Producer. Apart from this, the
Consumer also stores contextual information alongside
the permission details. More details on the contextual
data is given in Section 3.1.2. The Consumer syncs data
with the filesystem periodically to minimize impact on
system performance. All log data is written to the inter-
nal storage of the Android Phone because the Android
kernel is not allowed to write to external storage for se-
curity reasons. Although this protects our data from cu-
rious or careless users, it also limits our storage capacity.
Thus, we compressed the log files once every two hours
and upload them to our collection servers whenever the
phone had an active Internet connection (the average up-
loaded and zipped log file was around 108KB and con-
tained 9,000 events).
Due to the high volume of permission checks we encoun-
tered and our goal of keeping system performance at ac-
ceptable levels, we added logic so that the Consumer can
rate-limit itself. Specifically, if it has logged permission
checks for a particular application/permission combina-
tion more than 10,000 times, it examines whether it did
so while exceeding an average rate of 1 permission check
every 2 seconds. If so, the Consumer will only record
10% of all future requests for this application/permission
combination. When this rate-limiting is enabled, the
Consumer tracks these application/permission combina-
tions and updates all the Producers so that they start
dropping these log entries. Finally, the Consumer makes
a note of whenever this occurs so that we can extrapolate
the true number of permission checks that occurred.
3.1.2 Data Collection
We hooked the permission-checking APIs so that every
time system code was called to check whether an applica-
tion had been granted a particular permission, we logged
the name of the permission being checked, the name of
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the calling application, the API method that resulted in
the permission check, and various contextual data. Re-
call that permission checks not only occur when certain
protected API methods are called, but also when pro-
tected Intents and ContentProviders are accessed.
Thus, our logs differentiate between these three ways of
accessing protected resources.
With regard to contextual data, in addition to timestamps,
we collected the following types of data:
• Visibility—Whether the requesting application was
visible to the user or not, which we categorized into
four sub-categories: the application was running (a)
as a service with no visibility to the user; (b) as a
service, but interacted with the user via notifications
or sounds; (c) as a foreground process, but was in
the background due to multitasking; or (d) as a fore-
ground process with which the user was interacting.
• Screen Status—Whether the screen was on/off.
• Connectivity—Whether the phone was connected
to a WiFi network.
• Location—The user’s last known coordinates. In
order to preserve battery life, we collected cached
location data, rather than directly querying the GPS.
• View—The UI elements in the requesting applica-
tion that were exposed to the user at the time that a
protected resource was accessed. Specifically, since
the UI is built from an XML file, we recorded the
name of the screen as defined in the DOM.
• History—A list of applications with which the user
interacted prior to the requesting application.
• Path—When access to a ContentProvider object
was requested, the path to the specific content (e.g.,
photos, contacts, etc.).
Felt et al. proposed that most Android permissions
should require no a priori user approval, but 12 permis-
sions (Table 1) should be granted at runtime so that users
have contextual information to infer why the data might
be needed [14]. Specifically, if the user is asked to grant
a permission while using an application, she may have
some understanding of why the application needs that
permission based on what she was doing. We initially
wanted to perform experience sampling by probabilisti-
cally questioning participants whenever any of these 12
permissions were checked [29]. Our goal was to sur-
vey participants about whether access to these resources
was expected and whether it should proceed, but we were
concerned that this would prime them to the security fo-
cus of our experiment, biasing their subsequent behav-
iors. Instead, we instrumented the phones to probabilis-
tically take screenshots of what participants were do-
ing when these 12 permissions were checked so that we
could ask them about it during the exit survey. We used
Permission Type Activity
WRITE SYNC
SETTINGS
Change sync settings for an appli-
cation when the user is roaming
ACCESS WIFI
STATE
View nearby SSIDs
INTERNET Access Internet when the user is
roaming
NFC Communicate via NFC
READ HISTORY
BOOKMARKS
Read users’ browser history
ACCESS FINE
LOCATION
Read the GPS location
ACCESS COARSE
LOCATION
Read the network-inferred loca-
tion (i.e., cell tower and/or WiFi)
LOCATION
HARDWARE
Directly access GPS data
READ CALL LOG Read call history
ADD VOICEMAIL Read call history
READ SMS Read sent/received/draft SMS
SEND SMS Send SMS
Table 1: The 12 permissions that Felt et al. recommend
be granted via runtime dialogs [14]. We randomly took
screenshots when these permissions were requested by
applications, and we asked about them in our exit survey.
reservoir sampling to minimize storage and performance
impacts, while also ensuring that the screenshots covered
a broad set of applications and permissions [43].
Figure 1 shows an example screenshot captured during
the study along with its corresponding log entry. The
user was playing the Solitaire game while Spotify re-
quested a WiFi scan. Since this function was of interest
(Table 1), our instrumentation took a screenshot. Since
Spotify was not the application the participant was inter-
acting with, its visibility is set to false. The history shows
that prior to Spotify calling getScanResults(), the
user had viewed Solitaire, the call screen, the launcher,
and the list of MMS conversations.
3.2 Recruitment
We placed an online recruitment advertisement on
Craigslist in October of 2014, under the “et cetera jobs”
section.1 The title of the advertisement was “Research
Study on Android Smartphones,” and it stated that the
study was about how people interact with their smart-
phones. We made no mention of security or privacy.
Those interested in participating were directed to an on-
line consent form. Upon agreeing to the consent form,
potential participants were directed to a screening appli-
cation in the Google Play store. The screening applica-
1Approved by our IRB under protocol #2013-02-4992
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(a) Screenshot
Name Log Data
Type API FUNC
Permission ACCESS WIFI STATE
App Name com.spotify.music
Timestamp 1412888326273
API Function getScanResults()
Visibility FALSE
Screen Status SCREEN ON
Connectivity NOT CONNECTED
Location Lat 37.8735436 Long -122.2992491 -
1412538686641 (Time it was updated)
View com.mobilityware.solitaire/.Solitaire
History
com.android.phone/.InCallScreen
com.android.launcher/com.android.-
launcher2.Launcher
com.android.mms/ConversationList
Path N/A
Screenshot 898448929
(b) Corresponding log entry
Figure 1: Screenshot (a) and corresponding log entry (b)
captured during the experiment.
tion asked for information about each potential partici-
pant’s age, gender, smartphone make and model. It also
collected data on their phones’ internal memory size and
the installed applications. We screened out applicants
who were under 18 years of age or used providers other
than T-Mobile, since our experimental phones could not
attain 3G speeds on other providers. We collected data
on participants’ installed applications so that we could
pre-install their free applications on our experimental
phones, prior to them visiting our laboratory. (We copied
their paid applications from their phones, since we could
not download those from Google Play ahead of time.)
We contacted participants who met our screening re-
quirements by email to schedule a time for them to come
and visit us to do the initial setup. Overall, 48 people
showed up to our laboratory, and out of those 48 people,
40 qualified (8 had to be rejected because our screening
application was unable to distinguish some Metro PCS
users from T-Mobile users). In the email we noted that
due to the space constraints of our experimental phones,
we might not be able to install all the applications present
on their existing phones, and therefore they needed to
make a note of the ones that they planned to use during
the next week. The initial setup took roughly 30 minutes
and involved installing their existing SIM cards into our
experimental phones, helping them set up their Google
and other accounts, and making sure they had all the ap-
plications needed for the coming week. We immediately
compensated each participant with a $35 gift card for
showing up at the setup session. Out of 40 people who
were given phones, 2 did not return the phones, and 2
did not regularly use the phones during the study period.
Of our 36 remaining participants who used the phones
regularly, 19 were male and 17 were female; ages ranged
from 20 to 63 years old (µ = 32, σ= 11).
After the initial setup session, participants used the ex-
perimental phones for one week in lieu of their normal
phones. They were allowed to install and uninstall appli-
cations, and we instructed them to use these phones as
they would their normal phones. Our logging framework
kept track of every protected resource accessed by a user-
level application along with the previously-mentioned
contextual data. Due to storage constraints on the de-
vices, our software uploaded log files to our server every
two hours. However, to preserve participants’ privacy,
screenshots remained on the phones during the course
of the week. At the end of the week, each participant
returned to our laboratory, completed an exit survey, re-
turned the phone, and then received an additional $100
gift card for completing the study.
3.3 Exit Survey
When participants returned to our laboratory, they com-
pleted an exit survey. The exit survey software ran on
a laptop in a private room so that it could ask questions
about what they were doing on their phones during the
course of the week without raising privacy concerns. We
did not view their screenshots until participants gave us
permission. The survey had three components:
• Screenshots—Our software displayed a screenshot
taken during the course of the week when one of the
12 resources in Table 1 was accessed. Next to the
screenshot (Figure 2a), we asked participants what
they were doing on the phone when the screenshot
was taken (open-ended). We also asked them to in-
dicate which of several actions they believed the ap-
plication was performing, chosen from a multiple-
choice list of permissions presented in plain lan-
guage (e.g., “reading browser history,” “sending a
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SMS,” etc.). After answering these two questions,
they proceeded to a second page of questions (Fig-
ure 2b). We informed participants at the top of this
page of the resource that the application had ac-
cessed when the screenshot was taken, and asked
them to indicate how much they expected this using
a 5-point Likert scale. Next, we asked, “if you were
given the choice, would you have prevented the app
from accessing this data,” and to explain why or
why not. Finally, we asked for permission to view
that particular screenshot. This phase of the exit
survey was repeated for 10-15 different screenshots
per participant, based on the number of screenshots
saved by our reservoir sampling algorithm.
• Locked Screens—The second part of our survey
involved questions about the same protected re-
sources, however, this time these resources were
accessed while device screens were off (i.e., when
participants were not actively using their phones).
Because there were no contextual cues (i.e., screen-
shots), we outright told participants which appli-
cations were accessing which resources and asked
them multiple choice questions about whether they
wanted to prevent this and the degree to which these
behaviors were expected. They answered these two
questions for up to 10 different requests, similarly
chosen by our reservoir sampling algorithm to yield
a breadth of application/permission combinations.
• Personal Privacy Preferences—Finally, in order
to correlate participants’ responses with their per-
sonal privacy preferences, they completed two pri-
vacy scales. Because of the numerous reliability
problems with the often cited Westin index [45],
participants completed both Buchanan et al.’s Pri-
vacy Concerns Scale (PCS) [10] and Malhotra et
al.’s Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns
(IUIPC) scale [31]. We compared the average
scores of both scales.
After completing the exit survey, we re-entered the room,
answered any remaining questions about the experiment,
and then assisted the participant in transferring her SIM
card back into her personal phone. Finally, we compen-
sated each participant with a $100 gift card.
Three researchers independently coded 423 responses to
the open-ended question from the screenshot portion of
the survey. The number of responses per participant var-
ied, as they were randomly selected based on the num-
ber of screenshots taken by their phones. Participants
who used their phones more heavily had more screen-
shots, and thus answered more questions. Prior to meet-
ing to achieve consensus, the three coders disagreed on
the coding of 42 responses, which equated to an inter-
rater agreement of 90%. We used Fleiss’ kappa to assess
(a) On the first screen, participants answered questions to estab-
lish awareness of the permission request based on the screenshot.
(b) On the second screen, they saw the resource accessed, stated
whether it was expected, and whether it should have been blocked.
Figure 2: Exit Survey Interface
the reliability of ratings, taking into account the 9 possi-
ble codings for each response. The process resulted in a
kappa of 0.61, which indicates substantial agreement.
4 Application Behaviors
During the week that participants used our instrumented
phones, we logged 27M requests by applications to pro-
tected resources (i.e., those governed by Android per-
missions). This translates to over one hundred thousand
requests per user per day. In this section, we quantify
the circumstances under which these resources were ac-
cessed. We focus on the rate at which applications re-
quested access to protected resources when participants
were not actively using those applications (i.e., the situa-
tions that likely defy users’ expectations), access to cer-
tain resources with particularly high frequency, and the
impact of replacing certain requests with runtime confir-
mation dialogs (as per Felt et al.’s suggestion [14]).
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4.1 Invisible Permission Requests
In many cases, it is entirely expected that an applica-
tion might make frequent requests to resources protected
by permissions. For instance, the INTERNET permis-
sion is used every time an application needs to open a
socket, ACCESS FINE LOCATION is used every time
the user’s location is checked by a mapping application,
and so on. However, in these cases, one expects users to
have certain contextual cues to help them understand that
these applications are running and making these requests.
Based on our log data, most requests occurred while par-
ticipants were not actually interacting with those appli-
cations, nor did they have any cues to indicate that the
applications were even running. When resources are ac-
cessed, applications can be in five different states, with
regard to their visibility to users:
1. Visible foreground application (12.04%): the user
is using the application requesting the resource.
2. Invisible background application (0.70%): due to
multitasking, the application is in the background.
3. Visible background service (12.86%): the appli-
cation is a background service, but the user may be
aware of its presence due to other cues (e.g., it is
playing music or is present in the notification bar).
4. Invisible background service (14.40%): the appli-
cation is a background service without visibility.
5. Screen off (60.00%): the application is running,
but the phone screen is off because it is not in use.
Combining the 3.3M (12.04% of 27M) requests that were
granted when the user was actively using the application
(Category 1) with the 3.5M (12.86% of 27M) requests
that were granted when the user had other contextual
cues to indicate that the application was running (Cat-
egory 3), we can see that fewer than one quarter of all
permission requests (24.9% of 27M) occurred when the
user had clear indications that those applications were
running. This suggests that during the vast majority of
the time, access to protected resources occurs opaquely
to users. We focus on these 20.3M “invisible” requests
(75.1% of 27M) in the remainder of this subsection.
Harbach et al. found that users’ phone screens are off
94% of the time on average [22]. We observed that
60% of permission requests occurred while participants’
phone screens were off, which suggests that permission
requests occurred less frequently than when participants
were using their phones. At the same time, certain appli-
cations made more requests when participants were not
using their phones: “Brave Frontier Service,” “Microsoft
Sky Drive,” and “Tile game by UMoni.” Our study col-
lected data on over 300 applications, and therefore it is
possible that with a larger sample size, we would ob-
serve other applications engaging in this behavior. All of
Permission Requests
ACCESS NETWORK STATE 31,206
WAKE LOCK 23,816
ACCESS FINE LOCATION 5,652
GET ACCOUNTS 3,411
ACCESS WIFI STATE 1,826
UPDATE DEVICE STATS 1,426
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION 1,277
AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS 644
READ SYNC SETTINGS 426
INTERNET 416
Table 2: The most frequently requested permissions by
applications with zero visibility to the user.
Application Requests
Facebook 36,346
Google Location Reporting 31,747
Facebook Messenger 22,008
Taptu DJ 10,662
Google Maps 5,483
Google Gapps 4,472
Foursquare 3,527
Yahoo Weather 2,659
Devexpert Weather 2,567
Tile Game(Umoni) 2,239
Table 3: The applications making the most permission
requests while running invisibly to the user.
the aforementioned applications primarily requested AC-
CESS WIFI STATE and INTERNET. While a definitive
explanation for this behavior requires examining source
code or the call stacks of these applications, we hypothe-
size that they were continuously updating local data from
remote servers. For instance, Sky Drive may have been
updating documents, whereas the other two applications
may have been checking the status of multiplayer games.
Table 2 shows the most frequently requested permis-
sions from applications running invisibly to the user (i.e.,
Categories 2, 4, and 5); Table 3 shows the applica-
tions responsible for these requests (Appendix C lists
the permissions requested by these applications). We
normalized the numbers to show requests per user/day.
ACCESS NETWORK STATE was most frequently re-
quested, averaging 31,206 times per user/day—roughly
once every 3 seconds. This is due to applications con-
stantly checking for Internet connectivity. However, the
5,562 requests/day to ACCESS FINE LOCATION and
1,277 requests/day to ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
are more concerning, as this could enable detailed track-
ing of the user’s movement throughout the day. Sim-
ilarly, a user’s location can be inferred by using AC-
CESS WIFI STATE to get data on nearby WiFi SSIDs.
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Contextual integrity means ensuring that information
flows are appropriate, as determined by the user. Thus,
users need the ability to see information flows. Current
mobile platforms have done some work to let the user
know about location tracking. For instance, recent ver-
sions of Android allow users to see which applications
have used location data recently. While attribution is a
positive step towards contextual integrity, attribution is
most beneficial for actions that are reversible, whereas
the disclosure of location information is not something
that can be undone [14]. We observed that fewer than
1% of location requests were made when the applica-
tions were visible to the user or resulted in the display-
ing of a GPS notification icon. Given that Thompson et
al. showed that most users do not understand that appli-
cations running in the background may have the same
abilities as applications running in the foreground [42],
it is likely that in the vast majority of cases, users do not
know when their locations are being disclosed.
This low visibility rate is because Android only shows a
notification icon when the GPS sensor is accessed, while
offering alternative ways of inferring location. In 66.1%
of applications’ location requests, they directly queried
the TelephonyManager, which can be used to deter-
mine location via cellular tower information. In 33.3%
of the cases, applications requested the SSIDs of nearby
WiFi networks. In the remaining 0.6% of cases, applica-
tions accessed location information using one of three
built-in location providers: GPS, network, or passive.
Applications accessed the GPS location provider only
6% of the time (which displayed a GPS notification).
In the other 94% of the time, 13% queried the network
provider (i.e., approximate location based on nearby cel-
lular towers and WiFi SSIDs) and 81% queried the pas-
sive location provider. The passive location provider
caches prior requests made to either the GPS or network
providers. Thus, across all requests for location data, the
GPS notification icon appeared 0.04% of the time.
While the alternatives to querying the GPS are less ac-
curate, users are still surprised by their accuracy [17].
This suggests a serious violation of contextual integrity,
since users likely have no idea their locations are being
requested in the vast majority of cases. Thus, runtime no-
tifications for location tracking need to be improved [18].
Apart from these invisible location requests, we also ob-
served applications reading stored SMS messages (125
times per user/day), reading browser history (5 times per
user/day), and accessing the camera (once per user/day).
Though the use of these permission does not necessarily
lead to privacy violations, users have no contextual cues
to understand that these requests are occurring.
Application / Permission Peak (ms) Avg. (ms)
com.facebook.katana
213.88 956.97
ACCESS NETWORK STATE
com.facebook.orca
334.78 1146.05
ACCESS NETWORK STATE
com.google.android.apps.maps
247.89 624.61
ACCESS NETWORK STATE
com.google.process.gapps
315.31 315.31
AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS
com.google.process.gapps
898.94 1400.20
WAKE LOCK
com.google.process.location
176.11 991.46
WAKE LOCK
com.google.process.location
1387.26 1387.26
ACCESS FINE LOCATION
com.google.process.location
373.41 1878.88
GET ACCOUNTS
com.google.process.location
1901.91 1901.91
ACCESS WIFI STATE
com.king.farmheroessaga
284.02 731.27
ACCESS NETWORK STATE
com.pandora.android
541.37 541.37
ACCESS NETWORK STATE
com.taptu.streams
1746.36 1746.36
ACCESS NETWORK STATE
Table 4: The application/permission combinations that
needed to be rate limited during the study. The last two
columns show the fastest interval recorded and the aver-
age of all the intervals recorded before rate-limiting.
4.2 High Frequency Requests
Some permission requests occurred so frequently that a
few applications (i.e., Facebook, Facebook Messenger,
Google Location Reporting, Google Maps, Farm Heroes
Saga) had to be rate limited in our log files, so that the
logs would not fill up users’ remaining storage or incur
performance overhead. Our software probabilistically
began dropping log entries if during an application’s pre-
vious 10,000 requests for a particular permission, the av-
erage interval between requests was less than 2 seconds.
Table 4 shows the complete list of application/permission
combinations that exceeded this threshold. For instance,
the most frequent requests came from Facebook request-
ing ACCESS NETWORK STATE with an average inter-
val of 213.88 ms (i.e., almost 5 times per second).
With the exception of Google’s applications, all rate-
limited applications made excessive requests for the
phone’s connectivity state. Our hypothesis is that once
these applications lose connectivity, they continuously
poll the system until access is regained. All of these
applications’ use of the getActiveNetworkInfo()
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Resource Visible Invisible Total
Data Exposed Requests Data Exposed Requests Data Exposed Requests
Location 758 2,205 3,881 8,755 4,639 10,960
Read SMS data 378 486 72 125 450 611
Sending SMS 7 7 1 1 8 8
Browser History 12 14 2 5 14 19
Total 1,155 2,712 3,956 8,886 5,111 11,598
Table 5: The sensitive permission requests (per user/day) when requesting applications were visible/invisible to users.
“Data exposed” reflects the subset of permission-protected requests that resulted in sensitive data being accessed.
method resulted in these permission checks, which re-
turns a NetworkInfo object. This object allows devel-
opers to determine connection state (e.g., connected, dis-
connected, etc.) and type (e.g., WiFi, Bluetooth, cellu-
lar, etc.). Thus, these requests do not appear to be leak-
ing sensitive information per se, but their frequency may
have an adverse effect on performance and battery life.
It is possible that using the ConnectivityManager’s
NetworkCallback method may be able to fulfill this
need with far fewer permission checks.
4.3 Feasibility of Runtime Requests
Felt et al. posited that while most application permissions
can be granted automatically in order to not habituate
users to relatively benign risks, certain permissions re-
quests should require runtime consent [14]. They advo-
cated using runtime dialogs before the following abili-
ties, observed during our study, should proceed:
1. Reading the user’s location information, which in-
cludes using a conventional location API or scan-
ning for nearby WiFi SSIDs.
2. Reading the user’s web browser history.
3. Reading saved SMS messages.
4. Sending SMS messages that incur charges, or inap-
propriately spamming the user’s contact list.
These four resources/abilities are governed by the 12
Android permissions listed in Table 1. Of the 300 ap-
plications that we observed during the experiment, 91
(30.3%) performed one of these abilities during the study
period. On average, these permissions were requested
213 times per hour per user—roughly every 20 seconds.
However, permission checks occur under a variety of cir-
cumstances, only a subset of which allow applications
access to sensitive resources. As a result, platform de-
velopers may decide to only show runtime warnings to
users when protected data is read or modified. Thus,
we attempted to quantify the frequency with which per-
mission checks actually result in access to sensitive re-
sources for each of these four categories. Table 5 shows
the number of requests seen per user/day under each of
these four categories, separating the instances in which
sensitive data was exposed from the total permission re-
quests observed. Unlike Section 4.1, we include “visi-
ble” permission requests (i.e., those occurring while the
user was actively using the application or had other con-
textual information to indicate it was running).
Of the location permission checks, a majority were
due to requests for location provider information
(e.g., getBestProvider() returns the best location
provider based on application requirements), or check-
ing WiFi state (e.g., getWifiState() only reveals
whether WiFi is enabled). Only a portion of the
requests actually exposed participants’ locations (e.g.,
getLastKnownLocation() or getScanResults()
exposed SSIDs of nearby WiFi networks).
Although a majority of requests for the READ SMS per-
mission exposed content in the SMS store (e.g., Query()
reads the contents of the SMS store), a considerable por-
tion simply read information about the SMS store (e.g.,
renewMmsConnectivity() resets an applications’ con-
nection to the MMS store). An exception to this is the use
of SEND SMS, which resulted in the transmission of an
SMS message every time the permission was requested.
Regarding browser history, both accessing visited URLs
(getAllVisitedUrls()) and reorganizing bookmark
folders (addFolderToCurrent()) result in the same
permission being checked. However, the latter does not
expose specific URLs to the invoking application.
Based on our analysis of the API methods that resulted in
permission checks, we observed that sensitive data was
only exposed to applications during half of these permis-
sion checks, on average. For instance, across both visible
and invisible application requests, 5,111 of the 11,598
(44.3%) permission checks involving the 12 permissions
in Table 1 resulted in sensitive data being exposed to
those applications (Table 5).
While narrowing runtime permission requests down to
only the cases in which sensitive resources are being ac-
cessed will greatly decrease the number of times users
will be interrupted, the frequency with which these re-
quests occur is still too great to reasonably prompt the
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user each time a request occurs. We also do not believe
that the iOS model of only prompting on the first request
is appropriate, because our data shows that in the vast
majority of cases when protected resources are accessed,
the user has no contextual cues to understand that it is
occurring. Thus, a user may grant a request the first time
an application asks, because it is appropriate in that in-
stance, but then the user may be surprised to find that the
application continues to access the resource in other con-
texts (e.g., when the user is not using the application). As
a result, a more intelligent method is needed to determine
when a given permission request is likely to be deemed
appropriate by the user.
5 User Expectations and Reactions
To examine when users might want to be prompted about
permission requests at runtime, our exit survey focused
on participants’ reactions to the 12 permissions in Table
1, as well as limiting the number of requests shown to
each participant based on our reservoir sampling algo-
rithm, which was designed to ask participants about a di-
verse set of permission/application combinations. Thus,
we collected participants’ reactions to 673 permission
requests (≈ 19 per participant). Of these requests, 423
were accompanied by screenshots because participants
were actively using their phones when the resources were
accessed, whereas 250 permission requests were per-
formed while device screens were off.2 Of the former,
243 screenshots were taken while the requesting appli-
cation was visible in the foreground, whereas 180 were
taken while the application was invisible in the back-
ground. In this section, we describe the situations in
which permission requests defied users’ expectations.
We present explanations for why participants wanted to
block certain permission requests, the factors influenc-
ing those decisions, and how expectations changed when
devices were not actively in use.
5.1 Reasons for Blocking
When viewing screenshots of what they were doing
when an application requested a permission, 30 partic-
ipants (80% of 36) stated that they would have preferred
to block at least one request, whereas 6 stated a willing-
ness to allow all requests, regardless of resource type or
application. Across the entire study, participants wanted
to block 35% of these 423 permission requests. When we
asked participants to explain their rationales for these de-
cisions, two main themes emerged: the request did not—
in their minds—pertain to application functionality or it
involved information they were uncomfortable sharing.
2Our first 11 participants did not answer questions about permission
requests occurring while not using their devices, and therefore the data
only corresponds to our last 25 participants.
5.1.1 Relevance to Application Functionality
When prompted for the reason behind blocking a permis-
sion request, 19 (53% of 36) participants did not believe
it was necessary for the application to perform its task.
Of the 149 (35% of 423) requests that participants would
have preferred to block, 79 (53%) were perceived as be-
ing irrelevant to the functionality of the application:
• “It wasn’t doing anything that needed my current
location.” (P1)
• “I don’t understand why this app would do anything
with SMS.” (P10)
• “I don’t know why my alarm clock needs to know
where I am.” (P8)
Accordingly, functionality was the most common reason
for wanting a permission request to proceed. Out of the
274 permissible requests, 195 (71% of 274) were per-
ceived as necessary for the core functionality of the ap-
plication. Thirty-one (86% of 36) participants mentioned
perceived functional necessities as a reason for allowing
at least one permission request to proceed:
• “Because it’s a weather app and it needs to
know where you are to give you weather informa-
tion.”(P13)
• “I think it needs to read the SMS to keep track of the
chat conversation”(P12)
Beyond being necessary for core functionality, partici-
pants wanted 10% (27 of 274) of requests to proceed be-
cause they offered convenience; 90% of these requests
were for location data, and the majority of those appli-
cations were published under the Weather, Social, and
Travel & Local categories in the Google Play store:
• “It selects the closest stop to me so I don’t have to
scroll through the whole list.” (P0)
• “This app should read my current location. I’d like
for it to, so I won’t have to manually enter in my zip
code / area.” (P4)
Thus, requests were allowed when they were expected:
when participants rated the extent to which each request
was expected on a 5-point Likert scale, allowable re-
quests averaged 3.2, whereas blocked requests averaged
2.3 (lower is less expected).
5.1.2 Privacy Concerns
Participants also wanted to deny permission requests that
involved data that they considered sensitive, regardless
of whether they believed the application actually needed
the data to function. Nineteen (53% of 36) participants
noted privacy as a concern while blocking a request, and
of the 149 requests that participants wanted to block, 49
(32% of 149) requests were blocked for this reason:
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• “SMS messages are quite personal.” (P14)
• “It is part of a personal conversation.” (P11)
• “Pictures could be very private and I wouldn’t like
for anybody to have access.” (P16)
Conversely, 24 participants (66% of 36) wanted requests
to proceed simply because they did not believe that the
data involved was particularly sensitive; this reasoning
accounted for 21% of the 274 allowable requests:
• “I’m ok with my location being recorded, no con-
cerns.” (P3)
• “No personal info being shared.” (P29)
5.2 Influential Factors
Based on participants’ responses to the 423 permission
requests involving screenshots (i.e., requests occurring
while they were actively using their phones), we quan-
titatively examined how various factors influenced their
desire to block some of these requests.
Effects of Identifying Permissions on Blocking: In the
exit survey, we asked participants to guess the permis-
sion an application was requesting, based on the screen-
shot of what they were doing at the time. The real an-
swer was among four other incorrect answers. Of the
149 cases where participants wanted to block permission
requests, they were only able to correctly state what per-
mission was being requested 24% of the time; whereas
when wanting a request to proceed, they correctly iden-
tified the requested permission 44% (of 274) of the time.
However, Pearson’s product-moment test3 did not yield a
statistically significant correlation (r=-0.171, p<0.317).
Effects of Visibility on Expectations: We were par-
ticularly interested in exploring if a permission request
originating from a foreground application (i.e., running
visibly to the user) was more expected than one from a
background application. Of the 243 visible permission
requests that we asked about in our exit survey, partic-
ipants were able to correctly identify the requested per-
mission 44% of the time, and their average rating on our
expectation scale was 3.4. On the other hand, partic-
ipants were able to correctly identify the resources ac-
cessed by background applications only 29% of the time
(52 of 180), and their average rating on our expectation
scale was 3.0. A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test with con-
tinuity correction revealed a statistically significant dif-
ference in participants’ expectations between these two
groups (V= 441.5, p<0.001).
Effects of Visibility on Blocking: Participants were
willing to block 71 (29% of 243) permission requests
originating from applications running in the foreground,
3Both measures were normally distributed.
whereas this increased by almost 50% when the applica-
tions were running in the background invisible to them
(43% of 180). To examine whether invisible requests
were more likely to be blocked, we calculated the per-
centage of denials for each participant, for both visible
and invisible requests. A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test
with continuity correction revealed a statistically signifi-
cant difference (V=58, p<0.001).
Effects of Privacy Preferences on Blocking: Partici-
pants completed a combination of Buchanan et al.’s Pri-
vacy Concerns Scale (PCS) [10] and Malhotra et al.’s
Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC)
scale [31]. A Spearman’s rank test yielded no statisti-
cally significant correlation between their privacy pref-
erences and their desire to block permission requests
(ρ = 0.156, p<0.364).
Effects of Expectations on Blocking: We examined
whether participants’ expectations surrounding requests
correlated with their desire to block them. For each par-
ticipant, we calculated their average Likert scores for
their expectations and the percentage of requests that
they wanted to block. Pearson’s product-moment test
showed a statistically significant correlation (r=-0.39,
p<0.018). The negative correlation shows that partici-
pants were more likely to deny unexpected requests.
5.3 User Inactivity and Resource Access
In the second part of the exit survey, participants an-
swered questions about 10 resource requests that oc-
curred when the screen was off (not in use). Overall,
they were more likely to expect resource requests to oc-
cur when using their devices (µ = 3.26 versus µ = 2.66).
They also stated a willingness to block almost half of
the permission requests (49.6% of 250) when not in use,
compared to a third of the requests that occurred when
using their phones (35.2% of 423). However, neither of
these differences was statistically significant.
6 Modeling Users’ Decisions
We constructed several statistical models to examine
whether users’ desire to block certain permission re-
quests could be predicted using the contextual data that
we collected. If such a relationship exists, a classifier
could determine when to prompt users about potentially
unexpected permission requests. Thus, the response vari-
able in our models is the user’s choice to block the given
permission request or not. Our predictive variables con-
sisted of the information that might be available at run-
time: permission type, requesting application, and visi-
bility of that application. We constructed several mixed
effects binary logistic regression models to account for
both inter-subject and intra-subject correlations.
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6.1 Model Selection
In our mixed effects models, permission types and vis-
ibility of the requesting application were fixed effects,
because all possible values for each variable existed in
our data set. Visibility had two values: visible (the user
is interacting with the application or has other contextual
cues to know that it is running) and invisible. Permission
types were categorized based on Table 5. The application
name and the participant ID were included as random ef-
fects, because our survey data did not have an exhaustive
list of all possible applications a user could run, and the
participant has a non-systematic effect on the data.
Table 6 shows two goodness-of-fit metrics: the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC). Lower values for AIC and BIC repre-
sent better fit. Table 6 shows the different parameters
included in each model. We found no evidence of inter-
action effects and therefore did not include them. Visual
inspection of residual plots of each model did not reveal
obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or normality.
We initially included the phone’s screen state as another
variable. However, we found that creating two separate
models based on the screen state resulted in better fit than
using a single model that accounted for it as a fixed ef-
fect. When the screen was on, the model including ap-
plication visibility and application name, while control-
ling for subject effects, offered the best fit. Here, fit
improved once permission type was removed from the
model, which shows that the decision to block a particu-
lar permission type changes based on contextual factors.
When the screen is off, however, the effect of permission
type was relatively stronger. Similarly, the strong subject
effect in both models indicates that these decisions are
highly nuanced from one user to the next. As a result,
any classifier developed to automatically decide whether
to block a permission at runtime (or prompt the user) will
need to be tailored to that particular user’s needs.
6.2 Predicting User Reactions
Using these two models, we built two classifiers to make
decisions about whether to block any of the sensitive per-
mission requests listed in Table 5. These corresponded to
1.3M requests in our logs. We used our exit survey data
as ground truth, randomly partitioning it into five groups,
which we used for 5-fold cross-validation. We used four
groups for training and one for evaluation. We iterated
over the entire process 5 times and therefore report the
averages over these 5 iterations.
We calculated the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) to capture the tradeoff between true-positive and
false-positive rate. The quality of the classifier can be
quantified with a single value by calculating the area un-
Predictors AIC BIC Screen State
UserCode 490.60 498.69 Screen On
Application 545.98 554.07 Screen On
Application
UserCode
491.86 503.99 Screen On
Permission
Application
UserCode
494.69 527.05 Screen On
Visibility
Application
UserCode
481.65 497.83 Screen On
Permission
Visibility
Application
UserCode
484.23 520.64 Screen On
UserCode 245.13 252.25 Screen Off
Application 349.38 356.50 Screen Off
Application
UserCode
238.84 249.52 Screen Off
Permission
Application
UserCode
235.48 263.97 Screen Off
Table 6: Goodness-of-fit metrics for various mixed ef-
fects logistic regression models on the exit survey data.
der its ROC curve (AUC) [23]. The closer the AUC gets
to 1.0, the better the classifier is. The AUC for a random
classifier is 0.5. When screens were on, the AUC was 0.7,
which is 40% better than the random baseline, making it
a fair classifier. When screens were off, the AUC was
0.8, which is 60% better than a random baseline, making
it a good classifier.
We ran the classifier on the log files we gathered from
users and had it predict the portion of sensitive requests
that users might want to block. When phone screens
were on, the model predicted that participants would
have blocked 35.29% of sensitive requests, blocking an
average of 645 requests daily. When screens were off, the
classifier predicted 35.1% of requests would have been
blocked (1,143 requests per user/day).
7 Discussion
We observed that in one week of standard smartphone
usage, 80% of our participants deemed at least one per-
mission request as being inappropriate. This violates
Nissenbaum’s notion of “privacy as contextual integrity”
because applications were performing actions that defied
users’ expectations [33]. Felt et al. posited that users
may be able to better understand why permission re-
quests are needed if some of these requests are granted
via runtime consent dialogs, rather than Android’s cur-
rent install-time notification approach [14]. By granting
12
permissions at runtime, users will have additional con-
textual information; based on what they were doing at
the time that resources are requested, they may have a
better idea of why those resources are being requested.
We make two primary contributions that system design-
ers can use to make more usable permissions systems:
we show that runtime notifications need to be tailored
to individual users’ needs and that platforms need to ac-
count for whether an application’s access to protected re-
sources is obvious to the user.
Based on the frequency with which potential runtime
permissions are requested (Section 4), it is infeasible
to prompt users each and every time. Doing so would
quickly overwhelm them and lead to habituation. Yet at
the same time, drawing user attention to the situations
in which they are likely to be concerned will lead to
greater control and awareness. Thus, the challenge is
in automatically inferring when users are likely to find
a permission request unexpected, and then only prompt-
ing them in these cases. Based on our data, we observed
that participants’ desires to block particular permissions
were heavily influenced by two main factors: their un-
derstanding of the relevance of a permission request to
the functionality of the requesting application and their
individual privacy concerns.
Our models in Section 6 showed that individual charac-
teristics greatly explain the variance between what dif-
ferent users deem appropriate, in terms of access to pro-
tected resources. While responses to privacy scales failed
to explain these differences, this was not a surprise, as the
disconnect between stated privacy preferences and be-
haviors is well-documented (e.g., [1]). This means that
in order to accurately model user preferences, the sys-
tem will need to learn what a specific user deems in-
appropriate over time. Thus, a feedback loop is likely
needed: when devices are “new,” users will be required
to provide more input surrounding permission requests,
and then based on their responses, they will see fewer
requests in the future. While we documented the fre-
quency with which protected resources were accessed,
future work is needed to quantify the varying contexts
in which it can occur. Specifically, habituation could be
drastically reduced (i.e., fewer runtime prompts) if users
are only asked for permission for unique combinations of
application, resource, and context. Future work is needed
to quantify the varying contexts, as they are likely to be
much more complex than “foreground vs. background
application” or “screen on vs. screen off.”
Beyond individual subject characteristics (i.e., personal
preferences), participants based their decisions to block
certain permission requests on the specific applications
making the requests and whether they had contextual
cues to indicate that the applications were running (and
therefore needed the data to function). Future sys-
tems could take these factors into account when decid-
ing whether or not to draw user attention to a partic-
ular request. For example, when an application that a
user is not actively using requests access to a protected
resource, she should be shown a runtime prompt. If
she decides to grant that request, then that decision is
likely to hold when she is actively using that same ap-
plication (and therefore a subsequent prompt may not
be needed). At a minimum, platforms need to treat
permission requests from background applications dif-
ferently than those originating from foreground applica-
tions. Similarly, applications running in the background
should use passive indicators to communicate when they
are accessing particular resources. Platforms can also be
designed to make decisions about whether or not access
to resources should be granted based on whether contex-
tual cues are present, or at its most basic, whether the
device screen is even on.
Finally, we built our models and analyzed our data within
the framework of what resources our participants be-
lieved were necessary for applications to correctly func-
tion. Obviously, their perceptions may have been incor-
rect in many cases, such that if they better understood
why a particular resource was necessary, they may have
been more permissive. Thus, it is incumbent on develop-
ers to adequately communicate why particular requests
are necessary, as this greatly impacts user notions of con-
textual integrity. Yet, no mechanisms in Android ex-
ist for developers to do this as part of the permission-
granting process. For example, one could imagine re-
quiring metadata to be provided that explains how each
requested resource will be used, and then automatically
integrating this information into permission requests.
Tan et al. examined a similar feature on iOS that allows
developers to include free-form text in runtime permis-
sion dialogs and observed that users were significantly
more likely to grant requests that included this text [41].
Thus, we believe that including succinct explanations in
these requests would go a long way towards preserving
contextual integrity by promoting greater transparency.
In conclusion, we believe this study was instructive in
showing the circumstances in which Android permission
requests are made under real-world usage. While prior
work has already established that most mobile permis-
sions systems are failing users, we believe our study can
benefit system designers by demonstrating several ways
in which contextual integrity can be improved, thereby
empowering users to make better security decisions.
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A Invisible requests
Following list shows the set of applications that have requested most
number of permissions while executing invisibly to the user and the
most requested permission types by each respective application.
• Facebook App— ACCESS NETWORK STATE, ACCESS FINE
LOCATION, ACCESS WIFI STATE ,WAKE LOCK, INTER-
NET
• Google Location—WAKE LOCK, ACCESS FINE LOCATION,
GET ACCOUNTS, ACCESS COARSE LOCATION, ACCESS
WIFI STATE
• Facebook Messenger—ACCESS NETWORK STATE, ACCESS
WIFI STATE, WAKE LOCK, READ PHONE STATE, INTER-
NET
• Taptu DJ—ACCESS NETWORK STATE, INTERNET, NFC
• Google Maps—ACCESS NETWORK STATE, GET AC-
COUNTS, WAKE LOCK, ACCESS FINE LOCATION, INTER-
NET
• Google (Gapps)—WAKE LOCK, ACCESS FINE LOCA-
TION, AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS, ACCESS NETWORK
STATE, ACCESS WIFI STATE
• Fouraquare—ACCESS WIFI STATE, WAKE LOCK, ACCESS
FINE LOCATION, INTERNET, ACCESS COARSE LOCA-
TION
• Yahoo Weather—ACCESS FINE LOCATION, ACCESS NET-
WORK STATE, INTERNET, ACCESS WIFI STATE, WRITE
SYNC SETTINGS
• Devexpert Weather—ACCESS NETWORK STATE, INTER-
NET, ACCESS FINE LOCATION, ACCESS COARSE LOCA-
TION
• Tile Game(Umoni)—ACCESS NETWORK STATE, WAKE
LOCK, INTERNET, ACCESS WIFI STATE, WRITE SET-
TINGS
Following is the most frequently requested permission type by appli-
cations while running invisibly to the user and the applications who
requested the respective permission type most.
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• ACCESS NETWORK STATE— Facebook App, Google Maps,
Facebook Messenger, Google (Gapps), Taptu - DJ
• WAKE LOCK—Google (Location), Google (Gapps), Google
(GMS), Facebook App, GTalk.
• ACCESS FINE LOCATION—Google (Location), Google
(Gapps), Facebook App, Yahoo Weather, Rhapsody (Music)
• GET ACCOUNTS—Google (Location), Google (Gapps),
Google (Login), Google (GM), Google (Vending)
• ACCESS WIFI STATE—Google (Location), Google (Gapps),
Facebook App, Foursqaure, Facebook Messenger
• UPDATE DEVICE STATS—Google (SystemUI), Google (Loca-
tion), Google (Gapps)
• ACCESS COARSE LOCATION—Google (Location), Google
(Gapps), Google (News), Facebook App, Google Maps
• AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS—Google (Gapps), Google (Lo-
gin), Twitter, Yahoo Mail, Google (GMS)
• READ SYNC SETTINGS—Google (GM), Google ( GMS ), an-
droid.process.acore, Google (Email), Google (Gapps)
• INTERNET—Google (Vending), Google (Gapps), Google (GM),
Facebook App, Google (Location)
B Permission Type Breakdown
This table lists the most frequently used permissions during the study
period.
Permission Type Requests
ACCESS NETWORK STATE 41077
WAKE LOCK 27030
ACCESS FINE LOCATION 7400
GET ACCOUNTS 4387
UPDATE DEVICE STATS 2873
ACCESS WIFI STATE 2092
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION 1468
AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS 1335
READ SYNC SETTINGS 836
VIBRATE 740
INTERNET 739
READ SMS 611
READ PHONE STATE 345
STATUS BAR 290
WRITE SYNC SETTINGS 206
CHANGE COMPONENT ENABLED STATE 197
CHANGE WIFI STATE 168
READ CALENDAR 166
ACCOUNT MANAGER 134
ACCESS ALL DOWNLOADS 127
READ EXTERNAL STORAGE 126
USE CREDENTIALS 101
READ LOGS 94
WRITE SMS 62
WRITE CALENDAR 60
Bluetooth 60
CONNECTIVITY INTERNAL 58
STATUS BAR SERVICE 57
READ SYNC STATS 56
NFC 51
WRITE SETTINGS 50
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE 48
PACKAGE USAGE STATS 28
SUBSCRIBED FEEDS READ 24
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C User Application Breakdown
This table shows the applications that most frequently requested access
to protected resources during the study period.
Application Name Requests
facebook.katana 40041
google.process.location 32426
facebook.orca 24702
taptu.streams 15188
google.android.apps.maps 6501
google.process.gapps 5340
yahoo.mobile.client.android.weather 5505
tumblr 4251
king.farmheroessaga 3862
joelapenna.foursquared 3729
telenav.app.android.scout us 3335
devexpert.weather 2909
ch.bitspin.timely 2549
umonistudio.tile 2478
king.candycrushsaga 2448
android.systemui 2376
bambuna.podcastaddict 2087
contapps.android 1662
handcent.nextsms 1543
foursquare.robin 1408
qisiemoji.inputmethod 1384
devian.tubemate.home 1296
google.android.gm 1180
lookout 1158
aol.mobile.aim 1125
google.android.music:main 1114
rhapsody 1074
google.android.gms 1021
yahoo.mobile.client.android.
fantasyfootball
886
jb.gosms 755
google.android.googlequicksearchbox 711
android.mms 695
ideashower.readitlater.pro 672
android.inputmethod.latin 672
google.android.gsf.login 618
pandora.android 611
google.android.apps.plus 582
andrewshu.android.reddit 569
tunein.player 556
airkast.KNBRAM 546
twitter.android 523
android.vending 486
yahoo.mobile.client.android.mail 480
sg.gumi.bravefrontier 473
yahoo.mobile.client.android.yahoo 458
nuance.swype.trial 402
viber.voip 392
zynga.words 388
touchtype.swiftkey 377
D Distribution of Requests
The two graphs shows the distribution of number of requests per day
per user and the distribution of request for a given day. First graph
shows the distribution of requests through out a given day averaged
across the data set and second graph shows the distribution of number
requests across days for each user.
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